Introduction
This chapter outlines the conditions and objectives of the merger between Daimler-Benz and Chrysler in 1998 as the point of departure for a turbulent restructuring story which ended up in the sale of Chrysler to the private equity group Cerberus Capital in May 2007. The company never became really integrated and the German management had to take over the responsibility for the whole group with Chrysler, Smart, Freightliner, Mitsubishi and Hyundai in deep crisis. The nine years of DaimlerChrysler are mainly the story of the failure of former CEO Jürgen Schrempps' 'world company' strategy. The permanent turnaround plans and restructuring programmes slowed down the ambitious internationalisation and synergy strategies and even forced the abandonment of some core projects. The DaimlerChrysler case shows the difficulties of transnational and intercultural mergers and of global corporate governance. The unintended outcome of the story is two new car groups, Daimler and Chrysler, clearly different from the pre-merger companies and with uncertain future. The analytical perspective adopted is a meso-political one concerning firms as complexes of power networks and interest constellations with a variety of internal and external actors involved. From this point of view, the DaimlerChrysler trajectory is a story of dynamic and contradictory interests, actors and alliances far away from neo-classical worlds of one-best-way optimisations and perfect competition in free markets.
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The merger of two different companies On 6 May 1998 the 'gamma-project', one of the best guarded secrets in industrial history, was announced. A new star was born by the merger of the Mercedes-star and the Pentastar, the first 'world company', and similar attributes were awarded. The protagonists of the merger, Jürgen Schrempp (Daimler-Benz) and Robert Eaton (Chrysler), spoke of the birth of the leading twenty-first-century automotive company and The Economist (9 May 1998) wrote: 'Once it was the Japanese who turned the world's car industry upside down. Now it is the Germans.' However, the following nine years of the merged company failed to fulfil any of the exaggerated expectations and turned out to be a turbulent story of crisis and repair management, abandoning step by step the ambitious world company strategy until reaching the final stage of divorce. Whereas Schrempp and Eaton spoke of a 'marriage made in heaven', others compared it to the match between Prince Charles and Lady Diana, a German aristocratic noble brand asking for the hand of a beautiful bride from the new world (Schneider, 2001 ).
The former trajectories 1 of the two companies had followed quite different dynamics. Daimler-Benz (DB) had been a pioneer of the German automobile sector, whose commercial vehicle business was internationalised soon after the Second World War, whereas the passenger car division followed the German export of premium articles model until the 1990s. In the 1980s, influenced by the oil crisis and the rising ecological movement, a new corporate vision named 'Integrated Technology Corporation' emerged in the DB headquarters under CEO Edzard Reuter (1987-95) to diversify its activities towards new potential growth sectors like financial services, electronics and aerospace. Several companies were purchased: AEG, Telefunken (consumer electronics), MTU (engines), Dornier, Fokker and MBB (aerospace, armaments); the Interservices AG (Debis) was founded and the automotive divisions (passenger cars and commercial vehicles) were converted into an autonomous company (Mercedes-Benz AG). In the mid-1990s the company passed through its most severe crisis in history with all non-automotive businesses incurring losses and abandoned the disastrous strategy. The new CEO Jürgen Schrempp (1995) designed the globalisation and restructuring strategy with a reconcentration on the automotive divisions and the sales or closures of other businesses. In the passenger car division the company pursued a globalisation and rationalisation strategy with four main elements: conversion into a full-sortiment producer, (re-)opening of the US market and the emerging markets, globalisation, and productivity and process improvement.
In 1998, the small city vehicle, the Smart Compact Car, co-developed with the Swiss clock producer Swatch, was launched. Together with the new A-class, this model aims at the lower volume segments. Niche markets are to be supplied by the M-class (All Activity Vehicle) and the SLK roadster, the
